Category Archives: B

Block exemption

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Block exemption

Block exemption (regulation) in the European Union Law

Concept of Block exemption (regulation) provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Regulation issued by the Commission or by the Council pursuant to Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, specifying the conditions under which certain types of agreements are exempted from the prohibition on restrictive agreements laid down in Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty. When an agreement fulfils the conditions set out in a block exemp-tion regulation, individual notification of that agreement is not neces-sary: the agreement is automatically valid and enforceable. Block exemption regulations exist, for instance, for vertical agreements, R & D agreements, specialisation agreements, technology transfer agreements and car distribution agreements.

Bid rigging

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Bid rigging

Bid rigging in the European Union Law

Concept of Bid rigging provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Particular form of coordination between firms which can adversely affect the outcome of any sale or purchasing process in which bids are submitted. For example, firms may agree their bids in advance, deciding which firm will be the lowest bidder. Alternatively, they may agree not to bid or to rotate their bids by number or value of contracts.

Buyer power

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Buyer power

Buyer power in the European Union Law

Concept of Buyer power provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Ability of one or more buyers, based on their economic importance on the market in question, to obtain favourable purchasing terms from their suppliers. Buyer power is an important aspect in competi-tion analysis, since powerful buyers may discipline the pricing policy of powerful sellers, thus creating a 'balance of powers' on the market concerned. However, buyer power does not necessarily have a positive effect. Where a strong buyer faces weak sellers, for example, the outcome can be worse than where the buyer is not powerful. The effects of a buyer's strength also depend on whether the buyer, in turn, has seller power in a downstream market.