Category Archives: D

Dominant position

Dominant position

Dominant position in the European Union Law

Concept of Dominant position provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): A firm is in a dominant position if it has the ability to behave inde-pendently of its competitors, customers, suppliers and, ultimately, the final consumer. A dominant firm holding such market power would have the ability to set prices above the competitive level, to sell products of an inferior quality or to reduce its rate of innovation below the level that would exist in a competitive market. Under EU competition law, it is not illegal to hold a dominant position, since a dominant position can be obtained by legitimate means of competi-tion, for example, by inventing and selling a better product. Instead, competition rules do not allow companies to () abuse their dominant position. The European merger control system ( Merger control procedure) differs from this principle, in so far as it prohibits merged entities from obtaining or strengthening a dominant position by way of the merger.

A dominant position may also be enjoyed jointly by two or more independent economic entities united by economic links in a specific market. This situation is called collective (or joint or oligopolistic) dominance. As the Court has ruled in the Gencor judgment, there is no reason, in legal or economic terms, to exclude from the notion of economic links the relationship of interdependence existing between the parties to a tight oligopoly within which those parties are in a position to anticipate each one another's behaviour and are therefore strongly encouraged to align their conduct in the market.

(See: Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 2(3) of the merger regulation; on collective dominance see also: Commission Decision No 97/26/EC of 24.4.1996 in Case IV/M.619 Gencor/Lonrho (OJ L 11, 14.1.1997, p. 30) and judgment of the Court of First Instance of 25.3.1999 in Case T-102/96 Gencor Ltd v Commission [1999] ECR, p. II-0753.)

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See also

  • Collusion
  • Oligopoly

Downstream market

Downstream market

Downstream market in the European Union Law

Concept of Downstream market provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Market at the next stage of the production/distribution chain, for example, the distribution and sale of motor vehicles would be a downstream market in relation to the production of motor vehicles.

Divestiture

Divestiture

Divestiture in the European Union Law

Concept of Divestiture provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Decision by a firm to sell part of its current operations, divisions or subsidiaries as a result of business restructuring in order to concen-trate on certain products or markets. Under EC competition law, divestiture may also be offered by firms as a commitment ( Commitments) to the Commission in order to eliminate competi-tion concerns related to a notified agreement or concentration.

(See: Article 6(2) and 8(2) of the merger regulation, as well as Section III(1) of the Commission's notice on remedies (OJ C 68, 2.3.2001, p. 3).)

Delegation of powers

Delegation of powers

Delegation of powers in the European Union Law

Concept of Delegation of powers provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): The Commission, as a collegiate body, delegates certain decision-making powers to its individual commissioners (empowerment procedure) or to directors-general (delegation procedure). A delega-tion of powers allows management, administrative, procedural and routine matters to be decided by the individual commissioner or director-general concerned. This mechanism ensures that Commission meetings are not overloaded and the decision-making process is not paralysed.

(See: Articles 13 and 14 of the rules of procedure of the Commission of 29 November 2000 (OJ L 308, 8.12.2000, p. 26).)

De minimis

De minimis

'De minimis' notice in the European Union Law

Concept of 'De minimis' notice provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Communication from the Commission clarifying under what condi-tions the impact of an agreement or practice on competition within the common market can, in its view, be considered to be non-appre-ciable, namely where the aggregate market share of the undertakings involved remains below certain thresholds. In addition, agreements between small and medium-sized enterprises are said to be rarely capable of significantly affecting trade between Member States or competition within the common market; they will in any event not normally be of sufficient Community interest to justify intervention. In short, agreements or practices falling under the 'de minimis' notice are considered to be of minor Community importance and are not examined by the Commission under EC competition law. National competition authorities may however, examine certain cases.

(See: Commission notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis) (OJ C 368, 22.12.2001).)

Duopoly

Duopoly

Duopoly in the European Union Law

Concept of Duopoly provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Special case of oligopoly: industry structure with two sellers. In competition cases the term is often also used for situations where two main sellers dominate the competitive structure and a fringe of smaller sellers adapts to their behaviour. The two main sellers are then referred to as the duopoly.

Decision finding inapplicability Adoption Procedure

Decision finding inapplicability Adoption Procedure

Procedure for the adoption of an Article 24(1) decision

Article 24(1) decisions are considered to be measures of management and administration. The Competition Commissioner is empowered to adopt them 1 . Article 24(1) decisions taken to enforce compliance with a decision requesting information (Article 18(3)) are subject to a sub-delegation to the Director-General.

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Since the Article 24(1) decision is an intermediate step and does not adversely affect the rights of the parties there is no need at this stage to issue a statement of objections, nor grant access to file and no need to hear the parties. 2

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The imposition of periodic penalty payment can be initiated by adopting an Article 24(1) decision on a stand-alone basis or by including the provisions relating to the imposition of a penalty in another decision (normally the decision that the periodic penalty payments are intended to enforce, such as an Article 18(3) decision).

Other Considerations

Since usual practice is to combine an Article 24(1) decision with the decision that the periodic penalty payments are intended to enforce, please refer to the relevant modules for such decisions regarding the detailed procedure for adoption.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Decision finding inapplicability Adoption Procedure in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Notes


[Note 1]
PV(2004) 1655, SEC (2004) 520/2.
[Note 2]
A contrario Article 27(1) of Regulation 1/2003.

Further Reading

  • Information about Decision finding inapplicability Adoption Procedure in “An Introduction to EU Competition Law”, Moritz Lorenz (Cambridge University Press)

Disclosure of confidential information

Disclosure of confidential information

Disclosure of confidential information

The provisional qualification of a piece of information as confidential is not a bar to its disclosure if such information is necessary to prove an alleged infringement (“inculpatory”) or could be necessary to exonerate a party (“exculpatory document”). 1

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In this case, the need to safeguard the rights of defence of the parties through the provision of the widest possible access to the Commission file may outweigh the obligation to protect confidential information of other parties. 2

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However, information may be disclosed pursuant to Article 12 Reg. 1/2003 for the exchange of information between the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States and pursuant to Article 15 Reg.1/2003 for the exchange of information between the Commission and national courts (See Module Cooperation with National Competition Authorities).

Other Considerations

Assessment of disclosure: It is for the Commission to assess whether the need to prove an infringement or the right of the defence of the parties may outweigh the protection of confidentiality, in any specific situation. The case team should make this assessment as soon as possible. The following factors, even if potentially conflicting, can play a role: – the relevance of the information in determining whether or not an infringement has been committed, and its probative value; – whether the information is indispensable; – the degree of sensitivity involved (to what extent would disclosure of the information harm the interests of the person or undertaking in question) – the preliminary view of the seriousness of the alleged infringement. The public interest in proving an infringement of competition law, the parties' interest in having exculpatory information in the file at their disposal for the preparation of their defence and the information providers' interest in protecting his confidential information must be considered. The latter interest depends on the damage that the disclosure could cause in the individual case. For example, if information is to be divulged to companies with significant market power, the danger of retaliation against the information providers needs to be taken into account. 3 Information provided by individuals who request confidentiality/anonymity should be treated with utmost care.

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Practical guidance: The case team can choose to provide the information providers with a draft non-confidential version of their documents. However, depending on the characteristics of the individual case, it can prove useful for reconciling conflicting interests to reveal the confidential information (only) partially or in an anonymous manner. 4 The Commission may: – Use information against the addressee of the final decision in a non-confidential or anonymous manner. According to the case-law 5 , the Commission is entitled to use in its final decision confidential information that has only been revealed in a non-confidential or anonymous manner. The General Court has acknowledged that the Commission may make use of an element of evidence even if it does not disclose the identity of the informer to the addressee of the Statement of objections. – Oblige the information providers to (partially) reveal information which is to be used in the final decision or which could be of exonerating value. According to Regulation 1/2003 and 773/2004, the confidential nature of a document is not a bar to its disclosure in these cases. Pursuant to Art. 27, the Commission is not prevented from disclosing and using information necessary to prove an infringement (See further below Section 2.4.2 on the “Akzo procedure”). – Many disputes can be avoided if it is made clear to the parties that the acceptance or refusal of a confidentiality claim is done with a view to establishing a Statement of Objections and in no way precludes a later assessment of the confidentiality of the information in the public version of the decision that will be published on the Internet.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Disclosure of confidential information in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Notes


[Note 1]
See Art. 27(2) Reg. 1/2003; Art. 15(3) Reg. 773/2004, Notice on access to file, para. 24.
[Note 2]
Case T-30/91 Solvay v Commission [1995] ECR II-1775, para. 81: “In the defended proceedings for which Regulation No 17 provides it cannot be for the Commission alone to decide which documents are of use for the defence. The Commission must give the advisers of the undertaking concerned the opportunity to examine documents which may be relevant so that their probative value for the defence can be assessed”.
[Note 3]
Case T-65/89 BPB Industries and British Gypsum [1993] ECR II-389; Case C-310/93 P BPB Industries and British Gypsum [1995] ECR I-865.
[Note 4]
This should only be done if it is indeed impossible for the companies to which the information is disclosed to directly or indirectly identify the provider of the information. This will depend on the circumstances of each case.
[Note 5]
Case T-44/00, Mannesmann Röhrenwerke [2004] ECR II-2223, para.84.

Further Reading

  • Information about Disclosure of confidential information in “An Introduction to EU Competition Law”, Moritz Lorenz (Cambridge University Press)

Decision finding inapplicability Effects

Decision finding inapplicability Effects

Decision finding inapplicability: Effects of Article 10 Decisions

Although an Article 10 Decision is declaratory in nature (as a corollary of the legal exception system), it is nonetheless capable of producing the legal effects laid down in Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003.

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It results from the Masterfoods 1 judgment of the Court of Justice and of its codification in Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 that Commission decisions have EU-wide legally binding effect. This binding effect is equally extended to decisions based on Article 10. In concrete terms, when national courts rule on agreements or practices which are the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to that decision, unless they first refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the validity of that decision. They must also avoid decisions which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission.

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The Article 10 Decision is of a declaratory nature, and based on the circumstances known to the Commission at the moment of its adoption and explained in some detail in the decision. If the circumstances change to an extent that materially affects the findings set out in the decision, it does not need to be revoked, but simply may no longer be invoked by the parties to their benefit, and will no longer block national proceedings within the meaning of Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Decision finding inapplicability Effects in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Notes


[Note 1]
Judgement of 14 December 2000, C-344/98 Masterfoods, [2000] ECR I-11369, paragraphs 51 ss.

Further Reading

  • Information about Decision finding inapplicability Effects in “An Introduction to EU Competition Law”, Moritz Lorenz (Cambridge University Press)

Disputes over confidentiality claims

Disputes over confidentiality claims

Disputes over confidentiality claims not settled – involvement of the Hearing Officer

Where a disagreement over confidentiality claims cannot be resolved: – The relevant addressee(s) are informed by a letter signed by a Head of Unit or case manager of those confidentiality claims that are not considered to be justified, the reasons thereof 1 and of the fact that: – they may address themselves, within a reasonable deadline to be set in view of the circumstances of the case (in some cases one week may be appropriate), to the Hearing Officer, who can decide on the disputed confidentiality claims 2 , and, – if they fail to address the Hearing Officer within the given deadline, the relevant confidentiality claims are considered to be withdrawn and the relevant information covered by those claims will be published.

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If the Hearing Officer is addressed within the given deadline: – The relevant procedure regarding the involvement of the Hearing Officer – pursuant to Article 8 of the Terms of Reference applies – In case the Hearing Officer is involved, a provisional version of the decision without the disputed parts will be published on the website. – The final non-confidential version will be disclosed on the date specified in the reasoned decision of the Hearing Officer notified to the provider of information, unless the addressee(s) brings an action against the Hearing Officer's decision before the General Court and makes a request for interim relief to the Court to suspend the effect of that decision.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Disputes over confidentiality claims in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Notes


[Note 1]
See Article 8(1) of the Hearing Officer Terms of Reference.
[Note 2]
See Article 8 of the Hearing Officer Terms of Reference.

Further Reading

  • Information about Disputes over confidentiality claims in “An Introduction to EU Competition Law”, Moritz Lorenz (Cambridge University Press)