Category Archives: L

Letter

Letter

Article 6 letter in the European Union Law

Concept of Article 6 letter provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Administrative letter by which the Commission informs a complainant of its intention to reject the complaint. This so-called Article 6 letter defines the Commission's preliminary position regarding a complaint, and gives the complainant an opportunity to make further observa-tions and comments within a specified time limit. Because of its nature as a preparatory and preliminary document, an Article 6 letter cannot be challenged in Court as a separately reviewable act. However the complainant may insist that a final decision rejecting his complaint be taken, which in turn is subject to judicial review by the Court of First Instance.

(See: Article 6 of Regulation No 2842/98 on the hearing of parties in certain proceedings under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 354, 1998, p. 18).)

Article 11 letter in the European Union Law

Concept of Article 11 letter provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Written request for information the Commission addresses to under-takings and associations of undertakings, as well as to governments and competent authorities of the Member States, in order to obtain the information necessary to conduct its investigations. Such requests can be sent to companies which are suspected of infringements, are party to a concentration or to third parties who may be in a position to clarify certain matters which are relevant for the investigation in question.

(See: Article 11 of Regulation No 17 and Article 11 of the merger regulation.)

Letter of formal notice

Letter of formal notice

Letter of formal notice in the European Union Law

Concept of Letter of formal notice provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Letter the Commission sends to a Member State, in particular in appli-cation of Article 86 of the EC Treaty, when it is alleged that the Member State enacts or maintains in force a measure which is contrary to EU competition rules. A letter of formal notice is the proce-dural equivalent to a () statement of objections sent to undertak-ings.

(See: Article 226 of the EC Treaty.)

Leniency

Leniency

Leniency (programme) in the European Union Law

Concept of Leniency (programme) provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): General term for the total or partial reduction of fines applied to firms that cooperate with antitrust authorities in cartel investigations.

The current leniency programme of the Commission is the 2002 notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, which replaces the 1996 notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases.

(See: OJ C 45, 19.2.2002; the new notice is also available on the web site of Competition DG at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/leniency.)

Leniency applications

Leniency applications

Dealing with leniency applications. Introduction

This manual provides case-handlers with practical guidance for the procedure in dealing with immunity and reduction of fine applications (hereinafter jointly called as leniency applications). The manual is a living document which is frequently updated. As such, it can only be treated as a useful reference point rather than a set of binding instructions.

More about Leniency applications

For guidance on the criteria and conditions for immunity and reduction of a fine, see the respective provisions in the relevant Leniency Notice (see Section 1.1. for guidance on which Notice to apply).

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Leniency applications in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Further Reading

  • Information about Leniency applications in EU Competition Procedure, 3rd. Edition, Edited by Luis Ortiz Blanco (Oxford University Press)

Leniency Applications Inquiries

Leniency Applications Inquiries

Dedicated fax and phone numbers

An undertaking wishing to apply for leniency is required to contact the Commission's Directorate- General for Competition. A dedicated fax number has been established for this purpose and it is published on the Commission's web-site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/leniency):

More about Leniency Applications Inquiries

Leniency fax was: +32-2-299 45 85

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Before sending the actual submission by fax, undertakings are advised to seek assistance by calling the following dedicated telephone numbers, which are also published on the Commission's website: Telephone numbers: +32-2-298 41 90 or +32-2-298 41 91.

Other Considerations

The above dedicated telephone numbers will put the undertaking (or its advisors) in contact with DG COMP for leniency applications. The contact persons for applicants are the Heads of Units (and Deputy Heads of Unit) of Directorate G.

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Undertakings or their advisers seeking information on leniency should always be referred to the above contact numbers.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Leniency Applications Inquiries in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Further Reading

  • Information about Leniency Applications Inquiries in EU Competition Procedure, 3rd. Edition, Edited by Luis Ortiz Blanco (Oxford University Press)

Leniency Applications Internal organization

Leniency Applications Internal organization

Leniency Applications Internal organization

All immunity applications should be addressed to and dealt with by the Cartels Directorate – Directorate G.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Leniency Applications Internal organization in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Further Reading

  • Information about Leniency Applications Internal organization in EU Competition Procedure, 3rd. Edition, Edited by Luis Ortiz Blanco (Oxford University Press)

Leniency applications Legal basis

Leniency applications Legal basis

Dealing with leniency applications Legal basis

2006 Leniency Notice: The Commission's current policy on leniency applications is described in the 2006 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (the “2006 Leniency Notice”) 1 . The 2006 Leniency Notice applies to all new leniency applications made since the publication of the Notice on 8 December 2006. The only exception to this is where another undertaking had already made a leniency application in respect of the same case under the 2002 Leniency Notice, in which case the 2002 Notice will apply to the entire case, including any subsequent leniency applications.

More about Leniency applications Legal basis

2002 Leniency Notice: The 2002 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (the “2002 Leniency Notice”) 2 applies to all cases where, prior to adoption of the 2006 Leniency Notice, an application for immunity or reduction of fines had been received. However, the section of the 2006 Notice on handling of corporate statements is applied from its publication on 8 December 2006 also to all applications made under the 2002 Notice.

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As the procedure for dealing with leniency applications is for most parts similar under both Notices, with few exceptions (such as in particular the marker system that applies under the 2006 Notice), the guidance hereafter deals with all applications unless specifically mentioned that it only concerns applications made pursuant to one or the other Notice.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Leniency applications Legal basis in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Further Reading

  • Information about Leniency applications Legal basis in EU Competition Procedure, 3rd. Edition, Edited by Luis Ortiz Blanco (Oxford University Press)

Letter of facts

Letter of facts

New Facts after Statement of Objections: Letter of facts

On the other hand, if new information only corroborates the objections already raised against the undertaking(s), i.e. if further evidence is brought forward in support of the objections already set out in the SO, it is sufficient to bring them to the attention of the parties by a simple letter (letter of facts), giving them a possibility to provide written comments on the new evidence within a fixed deadline 1 . Parties may ask for an extension of this deadline by first submitting a request in due time within the original deadline to the case team. In case of refusal or disagreement about the length of the extension, the matter can be referred to the Hearing Officer, by means of a reasoned request. 2

More about Letter of facts

Where, for instance, there is a new complaint containing facts other than those already communicated, but that corroborate the objections already communicated to the undertaking, a supplementary SO is not formally necessary; it is sufficient that the undertaking in question be informed of the contents of such complaint and that its reaction be recorded in writing. 3 Similarly, where the conclusions drawn earlier in the SO will not be altered, the Commission may forward evidential documents to the undertakings so that they may make their observations on them. 4 This ensures that the parties will be given due access to the file, without, however, the necessity to organise a new hearing. When the Commission merely communicates to a party a non-confidential version (or specific excerpts thereof) of the other parties' written replies to the Statement of Objections and gives it the opportunity to submit their comments (see above), this does not constitute a letter of facts.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Letter of facts in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Notes


[Note 1]
Case T-23/99 LR af 1998 v Commission [2002] ECR II-1705, paragraphs 188-190, Case T-340/03 France Télécom v Commission [2007] ECR II-107, paragraphs 28-37 and Best Practices Notice, paragraph 110; see also Commission Report on Competition Policy [2004], SEC (2005) 805 final, 10 in relation to Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 of 24.3.2004, Microsoft, paragraph 15.
[Note 2]
Article 3(7) of the Hearing Officer Terms of Reference.
[Note 3]
Joined Cases 209-215 and 218/78 Van Landewijck e.a [1980] ECR 3243, paragraphs 29-35.
[Note 4]
Joined Cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01-T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 Tokai Carbon Co Ltd and others v Commission [2004] ECR II-1181, paragraph 45.

Further Reading

  • Information about Letter of facts in “An Introduction to EU Competition Law”, Moritz Lorenz (Cambridge University Press)

Location

Location

Location

Normally, interviews will take place at the premises of the Commission, but they can also be carried out elsewhere, e.g. in the office of a national competition authority or the premises of the undertaking concerned. In the latter case the Commission needs – as indicated above – to inform the competition authority concerned and permit their presence in the interview.

More about Location

Whilst interviews normally require the physical presence of the interviewee and the interviewer in the same room, interviews can also be carried by any means, e.g. by telephone or video conference.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Location in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Further Reading

  • Information about Location in EU Competition Procedure, 3rd. Edition, Edited by Luis Ortiz Blanco (Oxford University Press)

Lack of European Union interest

Lack of European Union interest

Insufficient grounds for acting by conducting a further investigation ('lack of European Union interest')

The ECJ has ruled that the right to complain entails a right to receive a reasoned decision of the Commission that can be appealed to the European Union Courts. 1 Notwithstanding, the case law has recognised that the Commission is entitled to give differing degrees of priority to the complaints that it receives, taking into account the duration and extent of the infringements complained of and their effect on the competition situation in the European Union. It is therefore entitled to reject complaints when there are insufficient grounds for acting by conducting a further investigation into the alleged infringement (also known as 'lack of European Union interest'). 2

More about Lack of European Union interest

The Court has held that in order to assess the European Union interest in further investigating a case, the Commission must take account of the circumstances of the case and, in particular, of the matters of law and fact set out in the complaint referred to it. In particular, it must weigh the significance of the alleged infringement as regards the functioning of the internal market against the probability of it being able to establish the existence of the infringement and the extent of the investigative measures necessary in order to fulfil, under the best possible conditions, its task of ensuring compliance with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 3

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Under the case law, the Commission must take into consideration all the relevant matters of law and of fact in order to decide on what action to take in response to a complaint. More particularly, it must consider attentively all the matters of fact and of law which the complainant brings to its attention. 4 The case team may contact complainants in order to explore the background and facts underpinning the complaint and to gain a fuller understanding of the matter.

Other Considerations

The Commission may not, under the case law, exclude a priori and in general certain situations from its task as enforcer of the competition rules. A rejection for lack of European Union interest must therefore be based on the specific circumstances of the individual case, reflect a thorough examination of the facts and be based on a consistent set of reasons.

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The Commission has publicly identified the elements it looks at for determining whether a complaint submitted to it contains sufficient grounds for acting. 5 Under the case law, the Commission is not limited to the criteria already accepted by the Court. 6 It is therefore not excluded that new grounds for rejection may still arise in individual cases.

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When deciding whether there is a sufficient degree of European Union interest for acting, the Commission will normally look at the following criteria referred to above: the extent or complexity of the investigation required, the likelihood of establishing an infringement and whether in light of these elements it is proportionate to conduct an in-depth investigation;

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the significance of the impact on the functioning of competition in the internal market, as indicated in particular by: – the geographic scope of the conduct complained of, or the economic significance of the conduct complained of, or the size of the market, or the importance for end consumers of the products concerned or of the conduct complained of; or – the market position of the undertakings targeted by the complainant or the overall functioning of the market in question;

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the possibility of the complainant to bring the case before a national court, in particular taking into account whether the case is or has already been the subject of private enforcement or is of a type that can appropriately be dealt with by national courts;

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the appropriateness of acting on an individual complaint that concerns (a) specific legal issue(s) which the Commission is already in the process of examining in one or several cases or which it has already examined and/or which is the subject of proceedings before European Union courts;

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the cessation or modification of the conduct complained of, in particular where commitments have been made binding by a Commission decision pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 or where the undertaking(s) complained of has/have changed its/their behaviour for other reasons, provided that neither significant persisting anti-competitive effects nor the seriousness of the alleged infringement(s) constitute sufficient grounds for conducting a further investigation in spite of the cessation or modification; and

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the importance of other areas of European Union or national law affected by the conduct complained of, compared to the importance of the competition concerns raised by the complainant. This criterion relates for example to issues that contain some competition law elements but that would primarily and more appropriately be dealt with under the rules governing the functioning of the internal market.

The Commission is under an obligation to state reasons if it declines to continue with the examination of a complaint, and those reasons must be sufficiently precise and detailed to enable the Court effectively to review the Commission's use of its discretion to define priorities. The General Court verifies whether this condition has been complied with. 7

Complaints may contain a range of allegations. Sometimes part of a complaint gives rise to a priority investigation, while the remainder is not considered a priority. If the 'remainder' is a separate alleged infringement, it will in principle be treated as a complaint in its own right and may hence need to be rejected separately. In these cases, contacts with the complainant in view of withdrawal are particularly recommended.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Lack of European Union interest in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Notes


[Note 1]
Case C-282/95 P Guérin automobiles v. Commission [1997] ECR I-1503, paragraph 36.
[Note 2]
Cf. in particular Case T-24/90 Automec II [1992] ECR II-2223 and Case C-119/97 P Ufex [1999] ECR I-1341.
[Note 3]
Case T-427/08 Confédération européenne des associations d'horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR)/Commission, judgment of 15 December 2010, paragraph 158.
[Note 4]
Case C-119/97 P Ufex [1999] ECR I-1341, paragraph 86; Case T-427/08 Confédération européenne des associations d'horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR)/Commission, judgment of 15 December 2010, paragraph 28.
[Note 5]
See the Annual Report on Competition Policy 2005 and Notice on the handling of complaints, paragraph 44.
[Note 6]
Cf. previous footnote.
[Note 7]
Case T-427/08 Confédération européenne des associations d'horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR)/Commission, judgment of 15 December 2010, paragraph 28.

Further Reading

  • Information about Lack of European Union interest in “An Introduction to EU Competition Law”, Moritz Lorenz (Cambridge University Press)