Tag Archives: MO

Monopoly

Monopoly

Monopoly in the European Union Law

Concept of Monopoly provided by the “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy” (Antitrust and control of concentrations, published in 2002): Market situation with a single supplier (monopolist) who — due to the absence of competition — holds an extreme form of market power. It is tantamount to the existence of a dominant position. Under monopoly, output is normally lower and price higher than under competitive conditions. A monopolist may also be deemed to earn supra-normal profits (that is, profits that exceed the normal remuner-ation of the capital). A similar situation on the demand side of the market, which is with a single buyer only, is called monopsony.

Monitoring cease and desist orders

Monitoring cease and desist orders

Monitoring cease and desist orders (Art. 7(1) Reg .1/2003)

Most prohibition decisions include a so-called “cease and desist order”, i.e. an injunction to stop or not to repeat the same or a similar illegal conduct 1 . Unless specified otherwise, this injunction applies immediately. If, for objective reasons, it is not possible to end immediately the infringement, transitory deadlines may be granted to the companies.

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The monitoring of such cease and desist orders may be based on tools provided for in the decision itself, such as a reporting obligation. For example, a dominant company having abused its position through an illegal pricing policy may have to regularly report its prices to the Commission during a number of years.

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The violation of a cease and desist order may lead to the adoption of a periodic penalty payment decision (see Module on periodic penalty payment).

Other Considerations

The follow-up actions (such as a decision on periodic penalty payment) do not require the adoption of a decision to open proceedings neither do they require a decision to close proceedings once monitoring is no longer deemed necessary. The Commissioner for Competition can however issue a public statement to take note that the addressees of the prohibition decision have adjusted their behaviour to the cease and desist orders.

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Instead of pursuing an undertaking for violation of a cease and desist order the Commission may equally decide to open a new investigation (with a decision to open proceedings) in the case of infringements that were continued or repeated despite a prohibition decision including a cease and desist order. The starting date of such a new infringement would be the date of the previous Commission decision or a subsequent date from which the recommencing of the infringement can be proven. In such a case the legal entities within the undertaking that continued or repeated the same infringement may also be liable for the aggravating circumstance of recidivism 2 .

Resources

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References

  • Information about Monitoring cease and desist orders in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Notes


[Note 1]
It is generally worded as follows: “The undertaking(s) shall immediately bring to an end the infringement [described in Article 1 of the decision] insofar as it (they) have not already done so. It (they) shall refrain from any act or conduct described in Article 1 and from any act or conduct having the same or a similar object or effect.”
[Note 2]
See point 28 of the 2006 – Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003. Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006, p. 2-5.

Further Reading

  • Information about Monitoring cease and desist orders in “An Introduction to EU Competition Law”, Moritz Lorenz (Cambridge University Press)

Monitoring of binding commitments

Monitoring of binding commitments

Monitoring of binding commitments (Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003)

Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an end and the undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet the concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment or in a statement of objections, the Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on those undertakings (Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1/2003).

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The implementation of commitments often requires monitoring by the Commission. For details see the Module on commitment decisions.

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To enforce compliance with the commitments, the Commission can • impose fines if the undertakings or associations of undertakings fail to comply with a commitment (Article 23(2)(c) of Regulation No 1/2003); • impose daily penalty payments to compel the undertaking or the association of undertakings to comply with a commitment (Article 24(1)(c) of Regulation No 1/2003).

Other Considerations

For details on the procedure to follow if fines and/or daily penalty payments need to be imposed, see Module on Periodic Penalty Payment.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Monitoring of binding commitments in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Further Reading

  • Information about Monitoring of binding commitments in EU Competition Procedure, 3rd. Edition, Edited by Luis Ortiz Blanco (Oxford University Press)

Monitoring of NCA cases

Monitoring of NCA cases

Monitoring of cases on the basis of closed case fiche

The monitoring of cases which NCAs finally close is done jointly by the ECN unit and the sectoral unit concerned.

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For cases closed after the submission of an envisaged decision, particular attention is given to the further development (court review) where appropriate.

Resources

See Also

References

  • Information about Monitoring of NCA cases in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Internal DG Competition)

Further Reading

  • Information about Monitoring of NCA cases in EU Competition Procedure, 3rd. Edition, Edited by Luis Ortiz Blanco (Oxford University Press)